Eye on the Middle East | Between the International Court of Justice ruling and the Knesset decision, the world sees two states, and Israel sees one state

On July 18, the Israeli Knesset (the unicameral legislature) passed a resolution rejecting potential Palestinian sovereignty and the “two-state solution,” which envisions a stable and prosperous Palestinian state alongside Israel. Accuracy The resolution was passed by a large majority (68 to 9) one day before the International Court of Justice issued a historic (non-binding) ruling. Advisory opinion On July 19, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 2023 on the Israeli occupation of Palestine. While the court has long held that many Israeli actions in the occupied territories violate international law, the new ruling is the first direct determination of the illegality of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. On the one hand, the ICJ required states to make a mandatory distinction between Israel and the occupied territories, called on Israel to cease its illegal occupation and settlement activity, and held that Israel owed Palestine reparations for “damage caused to all natural or legal persons” in the occupied territories. On the other hand, the Knesset resolution declared that it “firmly opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan. The establishment of a Palestinian state in the heart of the Land of Israel would constitute an existential threat to the State of Israel and its citizens, perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and destabilize the region.”

The overwhelming support for the resolution dispels any remaining notion that talk of abandoning the two-state solution is nothing more than a political survival tool for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the far right. The support for the resolution from the relatively centrist National Unity party led by Benny Gantz bolsters this argument. Finally, the fact that opposition leaders (such as those from the Yesh Atid and Labor parties) chose not to attend the vote rather than vote against it bodes ill for the two-state concept and the amount of capital that Israeli political parties are willing to spend on it domestically.

the past

The Knesset resolution was more than just an immediate response to the (then-imminent) ICJ opinion. Numerous resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, as well as other international bodies, have long affirmed that Israel’s occupation and settlement construction in occupied Palestine are illegal. Historically, Israel’s response to such developments has been vocally critical, in rhetoric, and exacerbated by increased settlement activity, in substance. What stands out in the Knesset resolution, however, is its explicit rejection of the two-state solution, which in some respects is unprecedented.

Historically, Israel has accepted this principle, especially since the Oslo Accords (1993, 1995). In 2009, even Netanyahu had declared his readiness to accept this principle. Support A Palestinian state (albeit on terms that Palestinian leaders found unacceptable). Netanyahu remained committed to this in principle for the next few years, despite continued resistance from other far-right leaders who Pledge This would make it impossible for any Knesset resolution in favor of a two-state solution to pass. With his position in jeopardy due to corruption charges and unfavorable court rulings, Netanyahu is now in a very awkward position. Evacuation responsibilaty Until now, the two-state solution seemed to reflect Netanyahu’s reliance on far-right parties for political survival more than anything else. The Knesset decision points to a broader, more entrenched approach to Israeli policymaking (outside Netanyahu), historically.

As world public opinion (through multilateral institutions or otherwise) has historically converged against Tel Aviv on any issue, Israel has met this convergence with measures to reject such positions, at the same level. For example, as the United Nations intensified its calls for Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied since the 1967 war, Israel responded by de facto annexing East Jerusalem through the 1980 Jerusalem Basic Law and affirming the united city as the capital of Israel. Even when the UN Security Council declared this move null and void in Resolution 478 and called on states not to recognize the new capital, Israel persisted over the decades and received another boost under the Donald Trump administration in 2017, which moved the US embassy to Jerusalem. This position has held even in its relationship with its strongest ally, the United States, on those issues on which the country maintained a critical stance. February, He walksAnd July This year, Israel has announced expansion of settlements in the West Bank, even as the United States has announced its intention to annex parts of the West Bank. Criticize This move is evidence that this is a continuation of a long-standing approach, the fact that even when Joe Biden visited Israel as Vice President in 2010, Israel welcomed him with great enthusiasm. advertisement 1,600 new settlements in East Jerusalem (the occupied territories) that drew some rebuke from the then-vice president. Now, as global criticism mounts to generate renewed support for a two-state solution and the International Court of Justice explicitly calls Israel’s occupation illegal, Israel is meeting with an equally refusal—abandoning its previous approach of accepting the solution in principle but attaching its own conditions.

the future

The two-state solution is a reality in theory and law. Even the United States, along with the United Nations, has historically supported this proposal (with Antony Blinken, the former US Secretary of State). repetition While 145 of the 193 UN member states recognize a Palestinian state, India has historically stood by the two-state solution, even as its relations with Israel have grown, and has been particularly vocal in expressing its support for Palestinian sovereignty through 2024. This support for Palestinian statehood by states is based as much on geopolitical pragmatism as it is on ethics and principles. Given the drift toward stability driven by economic integration that characterized the Middle East before October 7, the current crisis has underscored the need to capitalize on this drift by resolving the most fundamental issue of West Asia’s fault lines, before it derails efforts to achieve stability. The more Israel dug in its heels to confront Palestinian statehood, the more it will push Arab states into making a choice they do not want to make—abandon Palestinian statehood or reassess their new formal and informal relations with Israel, already strained by the IDF’s disproportionate and disproportionate actions. random Israel is attacking civilians in Gaza. Conversely, the longer Israel resists the establishment of a Palestinian state, the greater the risk to major connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which largely depends on stable Arab-Israeli relations.

If Israel’s historical adherence to its longstanding resolutions on Palestinian sovereignty is any indication, Tel Aviv is more likely to double down on its opposition to Palestine in the short term than to back down. In any case, the future of stability in the Middle East now rests once again on the more fundamental issue of Palestinian statehood, not just the ceasefire in Gaza. It is this fundamentality that may force Israel to back down in the long run, if the political and economic costs ultimately become too high. So far, those costs have been minimal in substance.

Bashir Ali Abbas is a research associate at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research in New Delhi and a visiting fellow for South Asia at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC. The views expressed here are his own.